Federal Reserve System reserve requirements: 1959-88--a note by Joseph H. Haslag & Scott E. Hein
No. 8904
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM RESERVE REQUIREMENTS:
1959-BB--A NOTE
Joseph H. Haslat
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
and
Scott E. Hei n*
Texas Tech University and
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
March 1989
Research Paper
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
This publication was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org) Ho. 8904
FEDEML  RESERVE  SYSTEI4  RESERVE  REQUIREilEilTS:
1959-88--A l{oTE
Joseph  H. Haslagt
Federal Reserve  Bank  of  Dallas
and
Scott E. Hein*
Texas Tech University  and
Federal Reserve  Bank  of  Dallas
l{arch 1989
* The  views  expressed  in this  artjcle  are so1e1y  those  of the authors, and
should  not be attributed to either Texas  Tech  University, the Federal
Reserve  Bank  of Dallas, or the Federal  Reserve  System.Over  the last thirty  years, the Federal  Reserve  System  has  changed  both
the range  of deposit  classifications against  which  reserves  must  be held,
and  the level of reserve  requirement  ratios on numerous  occasjons. For
example,  with passage  of the Monetary  Control  Act in 1990,  the Federal
Reserve  system  was  given authorltJ to levy reserve  requirements  against  the
reservable  deposits  held at all  depository  jnstjtutions  that offer
transactions  deposits.  Prior to lg80, the Federal  Reserve,s  jurisdiction
was  limited to member  conmerci  al banks. In addition, the range  of deposits
against  which  reserve  requirement  ratios are set was  also changed  'in 1990.
tinfortunately, such  changes  make  comparisons  between  aggregate  reserve
requirement  structures extrernely  complex. Indeed,  Judging  whether  reserve
requirement  changes  have  been  raised or lowered,  on net, is difficult,  even
for  professionally  trained econonj  sts.l/
The  purpose  of this note  js two-fold.  First, we  describe  a sinple
summary  neasure  of changes  jn the reserve  requirenents  set by the Federal
Reserve  system. }lith this  summary  statistic,  it  is possible  to characterize
the effective path of reserve  requirernents  over the past thirty  years.  In
particular,  the effects of nodificatjons to the reserve  reouirement
structure  introduced  by the Monetary  Control Act of  19g0  have  been
puzzling.  cacy  and  winningham  (1982)  and  roma  (1988)  naintain that reserve
requirements  were' on net, raised by the Monetary  control Act.  The  evidence
presented  in this  paper,  however,  suggests  that reserve  requirements  have
fal  I  en.
The  second  aim  of this  paper  is to djscuss  the relationshio between
changes  in the reserve  requirement  structure and  the Federal  Reservers
holdings  of Treasury  debt.  Note  that the adjusted  monetary  base  direc  yreflects  all  Federal  Reserve  policy actions.  Thus,  for a given level of the
adjusted  monetary  base,  the effects of a change  in reserve  requi  renentq.  are
countered  through  the use.of the other tools of the Federal  Reserve. Ooen
market  operatio-ns-  are one  way  in the Federal  Reserve  could  offset the
effects of changes  -in reserve  requirements. Indeed,  open  rnarket  operations
are the tool most  frequently used  to conduct  monetary  policy, but these
transactions  involve the Federal  Reserve's  holdings  of rreasury  securities.
changes  in reserve  requirements  could  have  implications  for the amount  of
Federal  government  debt held by the monetary  authority.  specificaliy,  the
coordination  of changes  in reserve  requirements  and  the rising  Federal
budget  defi  ci  ts are  discussed.
I. Louis  Reserve  Adjustment Tho  (l'
of  Chanqes  in
Table  1 provides  a list  of reservabre  deposit  classifications  and  the
different  reserve  requirement  ratios for  two  years:  1979  and  19gg. The
1978  reserve  requirement  structure, which  predated  the Monetary  control Act
of  1980  (hereafter UMCA"),  appljed  to nenber_  banks  only.  In contrast, the
reserve  requirement  structure in l98B  appl.ied  to alI  depository
institutlons  that offer transactions  deposits.  Thus,  the two structures
presented  in Table  t  highl  ight one  key  feature of MCA;  the Federal  Reserve
system  adninisters reserve  requirement  policies to a greatiy expanded  set of
i  nst  i  tuti ons.2/
There  are three factors lrhich  rnake  it  impossible  to infer  the direct.ion
of change  in aggregate  reserve  requirement  ratios frorn  197g  and  19BB
presented  in Table  1.  First, as  Table  I indicates,  the reserve  requirement
ratio  which  app.lied  to nenber  banks  with net demand  aeposits''iSvets  Letween$0  and  $41-5  million were  lowered  from  1978  revels.  Table  1a1so  shows,
however,  that the reserve  requirement  ratios applied  to net demand  deposit
levels for depos.it  levels between  $41.5  rnillion  and  $100  njllion were
raised.  Unfortunately,  without jnformation  on the size of deposits  for
which  reserve  requirements  are higher  and  for those  with lower  reserve
requirenents' it  is  impossibre  verify whether  aggregate  reserve  requirenenf,s
were  effectively  lowered  or raised  on net demand  deposits  from 197g  and
1988.
Secondly,  the direction of change  for  some  types  of reservable  deposits
were  raised whereas  other types  were  possibly rowered. Even  if  the reserve
requirenents  for nernber  banks  were,  on net, rower  in lggg than in  197g,  the
Federal  Reserve  unambiguousry  raised the rates on eurocurrency  accounts.
Thirdly, even  if  ratios courd  be compared  directly  for nember  banks,
MCA  established  the Federal  Reserve  system  as the sole administrator  of
reserve  requirements  for deposi  tory i  nst'i  tuti ons  offeri ng transact.ions
accounts. This feature meant  that non-menber  depository  institutions  were
subject to the sane  reserve  requirement  structure as member  banks. |Jhile
non-nember  depository  institutions  generally  faced  h.igher  reserve
requirenents  after MCA,  the net effect on member  banks  and, therefore. on
the system  as a whore,  is  indeterminate. Thus,  the r97g  and  19gg  reserve
requirement  structures show  that drawing  inferences  base  on a time series of
the ratios is i  ncornprehensible.
The  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of St. Louls (hereafter  referred to as ,rSt.
Louis"), however,  does  calculate an aggregate  measure  of reserve
requirement  effects.  This measure,  referred to as the reserve  adjustment
magn.itude  (uRAl4"),  is then combined  with the source  base  to obtain itsmeasure  of the adjusted  monetary  base.  MM  reflects changes  in reserve
requirements  set by the Federal  Reserve  System. In doing  so, RAM  prov.ides
dollar measures  of changes  in reserve  requirement  ratios.
'To  illustrate how  RAM  is calculated,  suppose  that there  is a vector  of
deposits in existence,  Dt, aga.inst  which  a vector of reserve  ratios,  11, is
applied (t  denotes  time).  Today's  required  reserves,  then, are represented
by the following expression:
(1)  ri 01.
Suppose,  further,  that the reserve  requjrement  structure during  the  base,,
period  is given  by the vector  16.  Thus,  for the sane  deposit  crassification
'in (1), the expression  for St. Loujs  RAM  is qjven  bv:
(2)  RAMI  =  (rO - rt),  Dt .
The  RAM  component  of the st.  Louis  base  represents  the difference between
what  total  required  reserves  would  have  been  if  the base  period reserve
requirement  structure, 16 , had  been  in place  today.  Thus,  RAM  measures  the
dollar  amount  by which  required  reserves  differ  under  today's reserve
requirenent  structure and  that which  was  in prace  during the base  period.
RAM  provides  an aggregate  dollar  index  of the total  amount  of reserves
.absorbed  or freed" by reserve  requirement  ratio  changes. To illustrate,
suppose  all  reserve  requirenent  ratios are reduced  so that r0 < rt.  lljth
lower  reserve  requirement  ratios,  equation  (2) indicates that RAM  would  be
positive and  therefore, reflects the dollar amount  of reserves  .freed" by
incorporating  this  new  reserve  requirement  structure.  Increases  in reserve
requirenent  rat.ios, on the other hand,  would  result .in  a negative  RAl4,indicating an absorption  of reserves. RAM,  therefore, provides  qual  .itat.ive
infornation about  the direction of change  in reserve  requirements.  _:,  ,
2. Movements  in RAU  1959-88  .rr  ,
The  reserve  adjustment  magnitude  (RAl,l)  provides  informatjon  on  -,  ,
aggregate  reserve  requirements  as a result of changes  in reserve  requirement
ratios from  some  given  base  period.  Chart  I tracks the level of RAl4  from
1959  through  1988, according  to the nost recent estimates  provided  by the
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of St. Louis.  The  present  neasure  reflects a 1976-90
base  period for  reserve  requirement  ratios.f/
The  tjme path of RAM  displayed  in Chart  I  indicates two  main  results.
First, RAM  is roughly  $14  billion higher  jn l9g7  than  it  was  in LgSg.!/
This indicates that reserve  requirements  have,  on net, fallen over the last
thirty  years.  Suppose  that reserve  requirenents  had  not been  changed  since
1959. This supposition  jmpljes  that RAFI  equals  zero, ano  nence,  source
base  equals  adjusted  monetary  base. l.lith reserve  requirements  unchanged,
the source  base  must  compensate  for  the quantity of reserves  which  would
otherwjse  had  been  "freed'r  through  reserve  requirements. Thus,  in iggg. the
source  base  would  have  to increase  about  $14  billion  to be eoual  to the
adjusted  monetary  base.
Secondly,  the path  of RAM  over the 1959-88  Deriod  is consjstent  wjth
changes  in reserve  requirenents  occurring  in waves,  which  reflect  the major
changes  jn the reserve  requirement  structure that took effect dur.ing  thjs
period.  Between  1959  and  1980,  14  najor changes  in reserve  requ.irenents
were  implemented.  Over  the period 1959-1965,  only two such  changes  were
implemented,  Chart  L shows  that RAl.l  generalty  increased  dur"j.0g.the.firsthalf of the 1960s. Thus,  over  the period 1959-65,  the data suggest  that
reserve  requirements  were  effectively lowered.
Beginning  in 1966,  changes  in reserve  requirenents  occuffed  more
frequently., -Indeed,  except  for  1971,  the reserve  requirenent  structure v,ras
changed  each  year between  1966  and 1978.  As Chart I  indicates,  RA!,|
generally  declined  during  the period  1966-1974  which  jndicates  that higher
reserve  requirements  were  levied on  rnember  banks. Beginning  in 1974,
however,  a series of reduct'ions  jn reserve  requirernent  ratios were
initiated.  RAM  rose  during  the last half of the 1970s,  thus indicating  that
reserves  had  been  "  f  reed.  ,,Q/
The  1981-88  period 'is considered  separately  because  the frequent
changes  in reserve  requirements  exper.ienced  dur.ing  this  period  were  the
product  of l'lCA. Provisjons  were  included  jn l'lCA  which  allowed  for  the
changes  in reserve  requirements  to be phased-Jn.  There  were  two separate
phase-in  schedules  for  the changes  jn reserve  requirements:  members  banks
$/ere  provided  a phase-in  period  of four years  while and  the transition
period for  non-menber  institutions was  e'ight  years.Z/  During  the four years
in which  member  banks  reserve  requirements  were  being  phased-in,  RAM
increased  nearly $10  billion.  Thus,  during  the period  where  both  nenbers
and  non-members  were  experiencing  reserve  requirement  Changes,  the evidence
suggests  that a net decrease  in reserve  requirements  had  taken  place.
During  the 1984-88  period, only the changes  in reserve  requirenents
for  non-nember  depository  institutions  contjnued  to be phased-jn. RAM  fel l
slightly during  thjs period,  indicating  that a slight increase  jn reserve
requirements  had  occuffed. Overall,  RAM  has  increased  since.lgg0  which  is
consistent  with aggregate  reserve  requirements  being  effectively-lowered.oueto MCA.
3.  Effects  of  the l4onetary  Control Act of  l-980
What  was  the source  of the substantial changes  in reserve  requirements
in the 1980s?  Interestingly,  these  changes  bear  little  direct relationship
to explicit  nonetary  policy actions.  In fact,  the reserve  requirement
schedule  currently in place  was  set by the U.S. Congress,  not the Federal
Reserve  System. Congress,  with the passage  of MCA,  nade  two important
changes  in reserve  requirements  for depository  jnstitutions.
3.1 Two  Principle  Elements  of MCA
First,  Congress  imposed  universal  reserve  requirements  on al  1
depository  institutjons  offering transactions  deposits.  Prior to the MCA,
non-member  depository  institutions (including  savings  and  loan  associations,
nutual savings  banks  and  credit unions)  were  subject  to a variety of reserve
requirements  schedules  set primarjly dt the state level  , and  not by the
Federal  Reserve.8/  MCA  outlined  a "phase-in"  schedule  wherein  reserve
requirement  ratios were  gradually increased  for those  institutions
previously not under  Federal  Reserve  guidelines.  The  MCA  allowed  the Fed  to
set reserve  requjrements  for  all  these  institutions.  Although  the Federal
Reserve  was  given  this  discretion, it  did not choose  to use  these  pohrers.
Second,  the MCA  effectively provided  for reductions  jn reserve
requirement  ratios for member  banks. Again,  a phase-in  period  was  outlined.
Reserve  requirement  ratios for these institutions were  to be gradual.ly
phased  down  over the period 1980  to 1987. For example,  reserve  requirement
ratios on transaction  deposits  were  as high as 16 L/4%  for  large menber
banks  in  1979, By  the end  of the phase-in,  these  requirements  were,.reducedto 12%. The  Federal  Reserve  System  was  agajn  gjven  the ability  to alter
this schedule,  but decided  to stay  the four-year  transitjon plan  spelled  out
in MCA.
In summary,  the MCA  put in place  two  countervailing  forces acting on
effective reserve  requirenent  ratios for all  depository  institutions.
System  reserve  requirement  ratios were  phased-up,  from  a base  of zero, for
non-member  depository  institutions that offered transactjon  accounts. At
the sane  time, reserve  requirenent  ratios were  phased-dolrn  for nember  banKs.
3.2 The  rrNet"  Direction  of the Effects
There  seems  to be some  confusion  about  the net effects of these  two
forces.  Tona,  for  example,  writes that ,,while  lowering  the reserve
requirements  faced  by Fed  member  banks,  the act raised the reserve
requirenents  for  other banks  by enough  to increase  the overall reserve
burden."9/ This statement  suggests  that the net effect was  an increase  jn
required reserves  ratios for  all  depository  .institutions combjned.  A quick
glance  at Chart  1 indicates, however,  that as far as the final  effects of
the Act are concerned,  this conclusion  is  inaccurate. The  substantial rise
in the level of RAM,  beginning  in late 1981,-  suggests  a net reduction  in
effective required  reserves  for all  depos'itory  institutjons  combjned.
The lower reserve requirement  ratios  for  rnember  banks  had  more  of  an
effect on aggregate  required  reserves  than the irnposition  of higher  reserve
requirement  ratios for all  non-menber  depository  institutions.  This is
because  member  banks  are the larger depository  institutions  in our financial
system. Consequently,  the level of required  reserves  freed for  larger
member  banks  more  than offset the level of reserves  absorbed  by imposing
higher  reserve  requirenent  on non-member  banks.Monetary
Some  Implications  for  Federal  Governnent  Deficits
The .+. Contro'l  Act and
As indicated, the st.  Louis  RAM  measure  suggests  that the most  sizeable
changes  in reserve  requirement  ratios over  the past thirty  years  occurred  in
the early 1980s. These  changes  resulted  jn sizeable  reductions  in
effective reserve  requirements  for the banking  system. coincident  with
reserve  requirement  ratio  changes  were  sizeable  changes  in the Federai
Reserve's  balance  sheet.  In the face or  rl net reserve  requirement
reductions  reflecting rising  leve.ls  of RAM  between  early 19g2  and  early
1984,  the Federal  Reserve  had  to reduce  the source  base  by about  $10
billion  from  what  it  would  have  been  had  reserve  requirements  not been
changed. That is,  in order to offset the phased-in  reductions  in reserve
requirement  ratios,  legislated by congress,  the Federal  Reserve  was  forced
to sell approximately  $10  billion of its governnent  security  portfolio that
it  could have  kept had  the pre-Monetary  Control  Act level of reserve
requirement  ratios been  maintained.l0/ It  is  interesting to note that th.is
change'  forced on the Federal  Reserve,  occurred  at nearly the same  time that
the U.S. Treasury  was  increasing  its  aggregate  borrowing,  in response  to a
growing  federa'l  government  budget  deficit.  If  net reserve  requirements  had
not been  lowered  over the period, the Federal  Reserve  could  have  held abour
$10  billion more  of tl-s- government  debt,  without  increasing  the adjusted
nonetary  base  or the money  supply.
The  irony of these  events  is that at the same  time the Treasury  was
forced to  increase  its  boffowing  through  the issuance  of government
securities'  the McA  put in place  forces that necessitated  that the Federai
Reserve  reduce  its  holdings  of government  securities below  what  they would
have  been  had  the act not been  passed.Sumnary
The  St.  Louis  reserve  adjustment  magnitude  (RAM)  can  be used  to gauge
the aggregate  effects of periodic changes  in reserve  requirements  through
.  tjme.  In general  , movements  in RAM  through  tine suggests  that reserve
requirenents  have  declined  from  their  1959  levels.  Judging  monetary  policy
on the basis of past reserve  requirement  policy actions  undertaken  would
indicate an expansionary  tendency.
Most  recently, reserve  requirenent  ratio  changes  were  introduced  with
the l'lonetary  control  Act of  1980.  The  RAM  measure  indicates that  the system
effectively  lowered  reserve  requirement  ratios,  as a result of the Monetary
Control  Act of 1980. The  Monetary  Control  Act also had  irnplications  for
Federal  Reservers  abiljty to rrnonetize,'  Treasury  debt.  The  net reduction  jn
reserve  requirements  in the early 19g0's  meant  that the Federal  Reserve  did
not acquire  as many  government  securities as it  would  have,  had  MCA  not
been  passed. Interestingly enough,  reserve  requirement  ratio  reductions
were  enacted  at roughly  the same  time as the federal budget  deficit
increase.  The  expansionary  nonetary  policy effects of  lowering  reserve
requirement  ratios  inhibjted the Federal  Reserve  from  buying  Treasury
securities at the rate they would  have  w.ithout  the Monetary  Control  Act.
IO1.
FOOTNOTES
The  authors  wjsh  to acknowledge  Mike  Cox,  Alton Gjlbert,  Rik Hafer,
Evan  Koenig,  Cara  Lown,  Ken  Robinson  and  Dan  Thornton  for  helpful
comments  at various  stages  in the development  of this  paper.  The  usual
caveat.  app1ies.
As testimony  to this  fact,  we  cite Toma's  (1988)  cla.im  that ,'Although
the (Monetary  Control) Act lowered  reserve  requirements  for members  of
the Fed  and  raised then  for nonnenbers,  on balance  the reserve
requirement  burden  increased"  (emphasis,ours).  l,le  provide  evidence
later  in the paper  v{hich  suggests  that the reserve  requirement  burden
was  actually reduced  for al'l depository  institutions  combined.
2.  santoni (1985)  also recognized  the probiems  introduced  by the Monetary
Controi  Act of 1980  in comparing  reserve  requirenent  structures pre_
and  post-1980.
3.  The  St.  Louis  adjustment  presently  has  selected 19Z6-90  as the base
period.  See  Gilbert (1987)  for a descrjptjon  of the most  recent
revision in the procedure  adopted  by St.  Louis  to estimate  RAl4.
Issues  involved  in serecting  the base  period  are  discussed  separately
in Gjlbert (1980)  and  Tatom  (1980).
4-  Note  that the level of RAM  wilr refrect deposit  .levers 
shifts, as  well
as djfferent  reserve  requirement  ratios,  as long  as present  reserve
requirement  ratios are different from  those  of the base  period.
115.
Consider  the RAM  for  two  djfferent period. both  with the same  level of
reserve  requirenent  ratios, rL=  yZ.  Ram  for period  1wi1l  be (16  -
11)' Dl.  Ran  for period  2 will  be  (rp - 11),02. Thus,  while  11  = rZ,
RAMI  = q4Mt  as long as Dl  - 02.  0eposit  gro!/th,  for example,  will
lead to a larger RAM  whenever  today's reserve  requ  i  rernent  structure is
lower  than that of the base  per.iod. In this way,  RAlrl  does  not follow a
pure step-function  pattern, changing  only \^rhen  reserve  requ.irement
ratios change. Rather,  RAM  also changes  as deposit levels shift,  or as
depos'its  are shifted from  one  reservable  account  to another,
reflecting differences in required  reserves  across  deposits.
0ver the period 1959  to 1988.  the Federal  Reserve  increased  their
government  securities  holdings  by  roughly  $200  billion.  If  reserve
requirement  ratjos had  remained  at their  1959  levels, the Federal
Reserve  would  have  had  to increase  their  government  securjties holdings
by $214  billion to achieve  the same  increase  in the adjusted  monetary
base. In other  words,  the Federal  Reserve  could  have  jncreased  it,s
holdings  of governrnent  securities by about  7%,  if  reserve  requirernent
ratios  had  not been  lowered  over the period.
Table  1 also indicates  brief per.iods  where  RAM  exhibits abeffant
behavior. In particular, the sharp  upswing  in RAM  which  occurred  in
1972  reflects the basic  cornponents  which  are  used  in the calculation.
ln L972,  reserve  requirements  were  no longer  applied  to reserve  city
banks  or country  banks. Rather,  the new  structure was  based  solely on
the size of deposits.  This re-structuring was  phased-jn  over several
6.
12months,  and  reserve  requirements  appear  to have  effectively fal len
briefly,  A'lso  contributing to the increase  in MM  was  the depos.it
outflow  which  occured at this  tinre.  Other  things being  equal  ,
negative  deposit  growth  will  result in RAM  ,'changing  direction.',  The
sharp  reduction  in RAM  which  occuffed  in the late 1970s  reflects
negatjve  deposit  f1ows.  Reserve  requirements  were  not changed  between
1978  and  1980  so that deposit  outflows  due  to high market  interest
rates explain  th'is  aberat  ion.
1. See  McNeill (1980)  for  a nore  complete  description of the transition
provis.ions  in MCA  as they applied  to nember  commercial  banks  and  non-
member  fi nanci  al institutions.
8.  State reserve  requirement  ratios have  no effect on the RAM  conponent  of
the monetary  base.
9.  Toma's  point regarding  the overall effect of the Monetary  Control  Act
of  1980  on reserve  requirements  restates  the position taken  by Cacy  and
llinningham.  The  view  that reserve  requjrements  were  raised on net for
al1 depository  institutions  may  have  initially  been  true.  From  1980  to
1982,  RAM  fell.  The  final  effects measured  by RAM,  however,  suggest
that reserve  requirement  were,  on net, lowered  by MCA.
10,  See  Haslag  and  Hein  (1989)  for evidence  concerning  the coordination  of
monetary  policy tools,  Haslag  and  Hein  report that the source  base  and
RAM  are negatively (and  significantly)  correlated  over the per.iod  1959-
1388, indicating that the Federal  Reserve  was  coordjnating  policy
.  act  i  ons  .
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15Table  1-  Reserve  Requirements  of
Depository  Institutions for Selected  years
1988:  Applied  to Al'l Depository  Institutions
Net transactjons  accounts  percent  of deposits
$0-$40.5  rnitlion
More  than  $40.5  million
Net  personal  time deposi  ts
By  original maturi  ty
Less  than 1 1/2 years
I  1/2 years or more
Eurocurrency  I  jabi  I  ities
Al  I  types
19/8: Applied  to Member  Banks  Only
Net Demand -$6  - Sz
$2 - $10
$10  - 5166





$0  - $5, naturing  in
30 days to  179  days
180  days  to 4 years
over 4 years
Over  $5, matur.ing  ln
30 days  to 179  days
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